Why is socrates being prosecuted

Meletus' motivation in bringing charges against Socrates is a matter of considerable debate. It may have sprung either from his religious fanaticism or his anger over Socrates's association with the Thirty Tyrants. It is also possible that he was to some degree upset with the low opinion of Socrates for poets.

In Plato's Gorgias , Socrates accuses poets and orators of flattery and says that they move only women, children, and slaves. Greek historian Diogenes Laertius, writing in the first half of the third century, reported that after the execution of Socrates "Athenians felt such remorse" that they banished Meletus from their city. This report is often questioned, however, as it is inconsistent with other earlier writings which offer no such indication of widespread regret over the jury's actions in B.

Anytus, a powerful middle-class politician from a family of tanners, is generally considered to have been the driving force behind the prosecution of Socrates. Prior to his political careet in Athens, Anytus served as a general in the Peloponnesian War.

Blamed for losing Pylos to the Spartans, Anytus faced charges of treason, but was acquitted--with the help of a well-placed jury bribe, according to several accounts. Anytus gained influence in Athens by playing a leading role in the democratic revolt of B. Despite having lost property and money during the eight months the tyrannical oligarchy ruled Athens, Anytus made no attempt to compensate himself for his losses, thus earning additional favor with the public.

The jurors sat on wooden benches separated from the large crowd of spectators--including a year-old pupil of Socrates named Plato--by some sort of barrier or railing. Guilt Phase of Trial. The trial began in the morning with the reading of the formal charges against Socrates by a herald.

The prosecution presented its case first. The three accusers, Meletus, Anytus, and Lycon, had a total of three hours, measured by a water clock, to present from an elevated stage their argument for guilt.

No record of the prosecution's argument against Socrates survives. Easily the best known and most influential of the three accusers, Anytus, is widely believed to have been the driving force behind the prosecution of Socrates.

Plato's Meno offers a possible clues as to the animosity between Anytus, a politician coming from a family of tanners, and Socrates. In the Meno , Plato reports that Socrates's argument that the great statesmen of Athenian history have nothing to offer in terms of an understanding of virtue enrages Anytus. Plato quotes Anytus as warning Socrates: "Socrates, I think that you are too ready to speak evil of men: and, if you will take my advice, I would recommend you to be careful.

Plato quotes Socrates as saying, "I had a brief association with the son of Anytus, and I found him not lacking in spirit. Anytus almost certainly disapproved of his son's relationship with Socrates. Adding to the displeasure of Anytus must have been the advice Socrates gave to his son. According to Xenophon, Socrates urged Anytus's son not to "continue in the servile occupation [tanning hides] that his father has provided for him.

It is a matter of dispute among historians whether the accusers focused more attention on the alleged religious crimes, or the alleged political crimes, of Socrates. Stone attaches far more significance to the political crimes, while other historians such as James A.

Colaiaco, author of Socrates Against Athens , give more weight to the charge of impiety. Stone argues that "Athenians were accustomed to hearing the gods treated disrespectfully in both the comic and tragic theatre. Stone concludes: "One could in the same city and in the same century worship Zeus as a promiscuous old rake, henpecked and cuckolded by Juno or as Justice deified.

It was the political, not the philosophical or theological, views of Socrates which finally got him into trouble. Important support for Stone's conclusion comes from the earliest surviving reference to the trial of Socrates that does not come from one of his disciples. In B. Heliaea Law Court, scene of the trial of Socrates. James Colaiaco's conclusion that impiety received more prosecutorial attention than did political sins rests on Plato's Apology. Colaiaco sees Plato's famous account of the defense of Socrates as being--although far from a verbatim transcription of the words of Socrates--fairly representative of the major points of his defense.

He notes that Plato wrote the Apology within a few years of the trial and must have expected many of his readers to have firsthand knowledge of the trial. Why, Colaiaco asks, would have Plato misrepresented the arguments of Socrates, or hid key elements of the prosecution's case, when his actions in doing so could so easily be exposed?

Since the Apology seems to give great weight to the charge of impiety--and relatively little weight to the association of Socrates with the Thirty Tyrants--Colaiaco assumes this must have been a fair reflection of the trial. At the same time, Colaiaco recognizes that because of the association of Socrates with Critias "the prosecution could expect any Athenian jury to harbor hostile feelings toward the city's gadfly. Piety had, for Athenians, a broad meaning. It included not just respect for the gods, but also for the dead and ancestors.

The impious individual was seen as a contaminant who, if not controlled or punished, might bring upon the city the wrath of the gods--Athena, Zeus, or Apollo--in the form of plague or sterility. The ritualistic religion of Athens included no scripture, church, or priesthood. Rather, it required--in addition to belief in the gods-- observance of rites, prayers, and the offering of sacrifices.

Any number of words and actions of Socrates may have contributed to his impiety charge. Preoccupied with his moral instruction, he probably failed to attend important religious festivals. He may have stirred additional resentment by offering arguments against the collective, ritualistic view of religion shared by most Athenians or by contending that gods could not, as Athenians believed, behave immorally or whimsically. Xenophon indicates that the impiety charge stemmed primarily from the contention of Socrates that he received divine communications a "voice" or a "sign" directing him to avoid politics and concentrate on his philosophic mission.

A vague charge such as impiety invited jurors to project their many and varied grievances against Socrates. Dozens of accounts of the three-hour speech apologia by Socrates in his defense existed at one time.

Only Plato's and Xenophon's accounts survive. The two accounts agree on a key point. Socrates gave a defiant--decidedly un apologetic--speech. He seemed to invite condemnation and death.

Plato's apology describes Socrates questioning his accuser, Meletus, about the impiety charge. Meletus accuses Socrates of believing the sun and moon not to be gods, but merely masses of stone. Socrates responds not by specifically denying the charge of atheism, but by attacking Meletus for inconsistency: the charge against him accused him of believing in other gods, not in believing in no gods.

His father has committed an impious act that pollutes Euthyphro and his whole family, and this sin must be purged by means of prosecution. It turns out that the murdered man was a hired hand of Euthyphro's, helping with the farming on Naxos. The man got drunk and, in a rage, slit the throat of one of Euthyphro's servants. Euthyphro's father bound this murderer, threw him in a ditch, and sent for the Interpreter, the official who is responsible for dealing with such crimes.

But before the Interpreter could arrive, the hired hand died of exposure in the ditch. Euthyphro notes that his family is angry with him for carrying out such a prosecution on behalf of a murderer, but Euthyphro asserts that he knows better than they do the position of divine law regarding what is holy and what is unholy. SparkTeach Teacher's Handbook. Summary Summary Context Analysis and Themes 2a - 4e 4e - 6e 7a - 9e 10a - 11a 11b - 14a 14b - 16a.

Yes, Socrates; and, as I was saying, I can tell you, if you would like to hear them, many other things about the gods which would quite amaze you. I dare say; and you shall tell me them at some other time when I have leisure.

But just at present I would rather hear from you a more precise answer, which you have not as yet given, my friend, to the question, What is "piety"? When asked, you only replied, Doing as you do, charging your father with murder. And what I said was true, Socrates. No doubt, Euthyphro; but you would admit that there are many other pious acts?

There are. Remember that I did not ask you to give me two or three examples of piety, but to explain the general idea which makes all pious things to be pious. Do you not recollect that there was one idea which made the impious impious, and the pious pious? I remember. Tell me what is the nature of this idea, and then I shall have a standard to which I may look, and by which I may measure actions, whether yours or those of any one else, and then I shall be able to say that such and such an action is pious, such another impious.

I will tell you, if you like. I should very much like. Immediately following is Euthyphro's next proposal. Try to figure out why Socrates finds this proposal unsatisfactory -ch] Euth.

Yes, I should say that what all the gods love is pious and holy, and the opposite which they all hate, impious. Ought we to enquire into the truth of this, Euthyphro, or simply to accept the mere statement on our own authority and that of others? What do you say? We should enquire; and I believe that the statement will stand the test of enquiry.

We shall know better, my good friend, in a little while. The point which I should first wish to understand is whether the pious or holy is beloved by the gods because it is holy, or holy because it is beloved of the gods.

I do not understand your meaning, Socrates. I will endeavour to explain: we, speak of carrying and we speak of being carried, of leading and being led, seeing and being seen. You know that in all such cases there is a difference, and you know also in what the difference lies? I think that I understand. And is not that which is beloved distinct from that which loves?

Well; and now tell me, is that which is carried in this state of carrying because it is carried, or for some other reason? No; that is the reason.